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The use of comparator groups has to date been central to establishing a 
breach of s 19 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The New Zealand 
courts’ approach to the formulation of comparator groups admits a lack of 
a clear methodology. This paper argues that, in the absence of a framework 
guiding the formulation of the comparator, the methodology permits 
arbitrary and inconsistent decision-making. The flexibility of the approach 
risks premature exclusion of claims in reliance on intuitive rather than 
analytical reasoning, limiting the transformative potential of non-
discrimination provisions. Of particular concern is the involvement of 
matters of justification at the comparator stage. The High Court judgment 
in B v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development is emblematic 
of these concerns. Recent developments at the Court of Appeal in Ministry 
of Health v Atkinson and Child Poverty Action Group v Attorney-General 
have provided some guidance, but have not gone far enough. This paper 
recommends that the courts depart from requiring a comparator for claims 
under s 19. Where comparators are necessary, it is proposed that the courts 
defer to the claimant’s choice of comparator, and decouple the 
identification of differential treatment from questions of causation. 
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I Introduction 
 
Westen notoriously argued in his article, “The Empty Idea of Equality”, that 
the concept of equality and by extension, principles of non-discrimination, 
lack moral content:1 
 
[C]ategories of morally alike objects do not exist in nature; moral 
alikeness is established only when people define categories. To say 
that people are morally alike is therefore to articulate a moral standard 
of treatment—a standard or rule specifying certain treatment for 
certain people—by reference to which they are, and thus are to be 
treated, alike. 
 
That moral alikeness does not exist in nature does not render the causes of 
equality and non-discrimination at law meaningless. It does however 
demand that we pay closer attention to how we construct categories of 
likeness. Accordingly, Elias CJ for the majority observed in McAlister v Air 
New Zealand Ltd (McAlister) that, for a claim of discrimination to succeed, 
“the choice of comparator is often critical.”2 
 
Comparators are used to identify differential treatment in the first stage of 
the test for a breach of s 193 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(BORA).4 The comparative approach is simple: the characteristics of X and 
Y differ only on a prohibited ground of discrimination. Where X has been 
treated differently to Y, it can be said that X has suffered differential 
treatment on a prohibited ground. Yet what appears to be an intuitive and 
common-sense approach has proved more fragile.  
 
Following the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ministry of Health v Atkinson 
(Atkinson)5 some considered the New Zealand courts to have settled upon 
                                                
1 Peter Westen "The Empty Idea of Equality" (1982) 95 Harvard Law Review 537 at 545. 
2 McAlister v Air New Zealand Ltd [2009] NZSC 78 at [34]. 
3 Section 19(1) reads: “Everyone has the right to freedom from discrimination on the 
grounds of discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993.” 
4 This paper will not address the test for a breach of s 19 beyond the comparator stage. The 
current position is that a breach of s 19 consists of (i) differential treatment on a prohibited 
ground (ii) where such gives rise to a material disadvantage. See Ministry of Health v 
Atkinson [2012] NZCA 184, [2012] 3 NZLR 456 at [136]; Child Poverty Action Group v 
Attorney General [2013] NZCA 420 at [43].  
5 Ministry of Health v Atkinson [2012] NZCA 184, [2012] 3 NZLR 456. 
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an approach to discrimination.6 The recent High Court decision, B v Chief 
Executive of the Ministry of Social Development (B),7 indicates that even if 
the appellate judges have settled an approach, it has failed to translate into 
principled outcomes in the lower courts. The Atkinson approach was 
reaffirmed in the recent Court of Appeal decision Child Poverty Action 
Group v Attorney General (CPAG).
8
 Nonetheless, in the author’s view, 
neither provide a clear approach to the formulation of a comparator.  
 
In Part II, this paper argues that the lack of a framework for the formulation 
of comparators permits arbitrary and inconsistent decision-making. 
Particularly, potentially viable claims are prematurely excluded where 
courts intervene in the formulation of the comparator. The approach adopted 
in Atkinson and affirmed in CPAG goes some way to limiting the 
opportunity for premature exclusion, but does not go far enough.  
 
Part III will examine the New Zealand courts’ use of comparative 
methodology, and specifically the approach to formulating comparators. 
Particular attention will be paid to B.9 The formulation of the comparator in 
that case resulted in the premature exclusion of a claim, and is emblematic 
of the way in which the use of comparators can limit the scope of non-
discrimination provisions. 
 
Substantive recommendations will be explored in Part IV. Departure from 
reliance upon the comparator as the exclusive means for the identification of 
differential treatment is desirable. In any event a firm bedrock of principle 
must underpin the methodology. Particularly, the choice of the comparator 
should be the prerogative of the claimant. Further, the question of 
differential treatment should be distinct from questions of causation. 
 
                                                
6 Vanessa Haggie “Premature Justification: The Place of Comparator Group Analysis in 
Discrimination Law in Canada and New Zealand” (LLM Research Paper, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 2012) at 13. 
7 B v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development [2012] NZHC 3165. 
8 Child Poverty Action Group v Attorney General [2013] NZCA 420. 
9 This paper is based on a critique of B v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social 
Development [2012] NZHC 3165. Shortly before submission, the Court of Appeal handed 
down the judgment in Child Poverty Action Group v Attorney General [2013] NZCA 420. 
The latter will be considered where relevant. 
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II Limitations of Comparator Reasoning 
 
The rationale for the comparator derives from the apparently common-sense 
observation that discrimination can only be ascertained “by comparison 
with the condition of others”10—the court should be comparing “apples with 
apples”.11 As set out in the example given above, X and Y were in all 
respects alike but for the prohibited ground. Yet no two people are alike in 
all respects. If the ambition of the claim were refined, it could instead be 
said that X and Y are alike in all material respects. But without some 
framework for determining what characteristics are ‘material’, the latter 
formulation is no more helpful. 
 
A ‘treat likes alike’ formulation relies on a series of underlying norms 
governing who can be considered alike. Westen, commenting on the Equal 
Protection clause of the US Constitution, argues that the notion of equality 
relies on background norms concerning which persons are to be seen as 
equal. In effect, “the equality formula presupposes anterior constitutional 
standards for ascertaining 'likeness' and 'unlikeness'.”
12
 In the New Zealand 
non-discrimination context, the norms to which Westen refers manifest 
themselves in the rationales that underlie courts’ decisions about which 
comparator is appropriate. 
 
The comparative methodology is in truth a vehicle for these norms, while 
appearing to be a neutral framework for identifying differential treatment. 
The desire for apparent neutrality is not surprising, argues Goldman, as 
“[w]ith their empirical, legalistic cast, comparators strongly suggest that a 
court’s finding of impermissible discrimination is [not] the product of ... an 
amateur judicial evaluation of social norms”.13 Yet, this appearance of 
neutrality is itself cause for concern as these norms, to the extent that they 
operate under the guise of an apparently neutral methodology, remain 
inarticulate and under-scrutinised. 
 
                                                
10 Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 SCR 143 at 164 per McIntyre J. 
11 Child Poverty Action Group v Attorney General, above n 8, at [51]. 
12 Westen, above n 1, at 560. 
13 Suzanne Goldberg "Discrimination by comparison” (2010) 120 Yale LJ 728 at 802. 
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A Premature Justification 
 
The first concern about the use of the comparator is that it can allow for the 
premature justification of alleged discrimination without sufficient scrutiny. 
The various schema of non-discrimination provisions treat the identification 
and justification of discrimination as discrete enquiries. For instance, s 19 
can bear a neutral interpretation: has the claimant been treated differently on 
a prohibited ground resulting in a material disadvantage?14 The presence of 
s 5 as a broad catch-all justification provision
15
 provides the alleged 
discriminator an opportunity to justify the impugned actions.16  
 
The Court of Appeal has acknowledged that the doctrinally correct approach 
is to allow BORA rights to bear wide meaning, conditioned by justifiable 
limits permissible by dint of s 5.
17
 This means that matters of justification 
are not relevant the identification of differential treatment and, by extension, 
the comparator. Indeed, the Court of Appeal noted the undesirability of 
‘justification creep’ whereby matters properly addressed by s 5 were 
imported into the s 19 enquiry.18 This position was reaffirmed in CPAG.19 
Similarly, concerning the Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA), Elias CJ 
for the majority noted in McAlister that a comparison that took on the work 
of justification would leave “no work” for the exception provisions.20  
 
The division between identifying and justifying discrimination creates 
valuable safeguards. Treating the enquiries as separate ensures the fair 
allocation of burdens of proof and demands that possibly discriminatory 
                                                
14 Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 5, at [55] and [136]. But see Geoffrey Palmer “A 
Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper” (Government Printer, Wellington, 1985) at 
[10.78]. 
15 Section 5 reads: “Subject to section 4, the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of 
Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” 
16 Compare s 106 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. 
17 Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 5, at [127]. See also Hansen v R [2007] NSZC 7 
at [17] per Elias CJ. Contrast Grant Huscroft “Freedom from Discrimination” in Paul 
Rishworth and others The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 
2003) 366 at 378. 
18 Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 5, at [132]. 
19 Child Poverty Action Group v Attorney General, above n 8, at [65].  
20 McAlister v Air New Zealand Ltd, above n 2, at [37]. 
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actions are subject to an appropriate level of scrutiny. Where the two 
enquiries are elided those safeguards are subverted, leading to the possible 
premature exclusion of what would otherwise be viable claims of 
discrimination.  
 
1 The tendency to import justification 
 
The incorporation of justification into the comparison is likely to occur in 
two circumstances. The first is where the court believes that the differential 
treatment is not deserving of being described as discriminatory. The second 
is where the court considers there to be a plausible alternative explanation 
for the differential treatment that suggests it was not on the basis of a 
prohibited ground. The intrusion of these determinations in the construction 
of comparators is encouraged by the intrinsic similarity between identifying 
and justifying differential treatment. As Clayton and Tomlinson observe, 
“justification of the discrimination will often depend on showing that the 
positions of the two comparators are not, in truth, analogous.”
21
 The elision 
will occur where the comparator is not independent from what Monoghan 
terms the “discriminatory circumstances”22—the characteristics of the 
claimant that might well be alternate rationales or justifications for 
differential treatment.  
 
Consider, for example, a tax-credit conditional upon family status. A 
claimant may allege that the scheme results in her being treated differently 
despite being in all material ways alike to a recipient of the credit but for 
family status. One of the discriminatory circumstances is that they likely 
have different financial needs by dint of family status. Presumably the 
legislative purpose of the scheme is to cater to those different needs. The 
scheme might be defended as having a justifiable goal. The claimant’s 
approach to the case relies on proving similarity with the comparator—they 
are alike but for family status. The defendant’s approach relies on proving 
the contrary—they are not alike because family status reflects an important 
                                                
21 Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson The Law of Human Rights (2nd ed, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2009) at [17.138]. 
22 Karon Monoghan Equality Law (Oxford University Press, New York, 2007) at [6.39]. 
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difference, that being financial needs. The questions are two sides of the 
same coin—they each pertain to the comparability or otherwise of the 
claimant and their proposed comparator. The latter, though, is a matter for 
justification as it is relevant not to whether there has been differential 
treatment but rather whether such is justifiable.  
 
If the conceptual boundary between identification and justification of 
discrimination is less than clear, the similarity of the two questions leads to 
them being asked simultaneously. The discriminator’s reasons for treating 
the two differently become the court’s reasons for denying that the claimant 
is in fact comparable with the proposed comparator.23 Instead of asking 
whether there has been differential treatment, the question becomes one of 
whether different treatment would be justifiable. Where it is thought that 
differential treatment is justifiable, the likely conclusion is that the two 
groups are not legitimately comparable: claimant and their comparator are 
not comparable because they have different financial needs. The 
discriminatory circumstances become a proxy for the prohibited ground 
when they are subsumed into the comparator, shifting focus from the 
prohibited ground to the legislative purpose or justification.24 The 
comparator takes on the work of s 5 and is no longer a neutral means for 
identifying differential treatment.  
 
But that reasoning, Haggie suggests, “builds in tacit acceptance of a 
disputed policy at too early a stage and artificially removes the disputed 
point of discrimination.”25 Considering the discriminatory circumstances at 
the comparator stage increases the tendency for the construction of a 
comparator in such a way that denies the very possibility of discrimination. 
 
 
 
                                                
23 See the criticism of Granovsky v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 
2000 SCC 28, [2000] 1 SCR 703 in Daphne Gilbert and Diana Majury “Critical 
Comparisons: the Supreme Court of Canada Dooms Section 15” (2006) 23 Windsor YB 
Access Just 111 at 124. 
24 See R (on the Application of Al Rawi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs [2006] EWCA Civ 1279, [2007] 2 WLR 1219 at [78]. 
25 Haggie, above n 6, at 27. 
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2 Sufficient scrutiny 
 
The tendency to import justification allows intuitive reactions to supplant 
sufficient scrutiny. Without any framework that governs who can be 
compared to whom, the enquiry becomes driven by instinct. The inherent 
flexibility of the exercise allows it to “slip into arbitrary and inconsistent 
reasoning"26 which provides the appearance, but not substance, of analysis. 
Where a case concerns “discrimination which is regarded as ‘normal’” or 
‘acceptable’,
27
 the belief that the practice in question does not deserve to be 
labelled discrimination encourages the formulation of a comparator that 
incorporates the discriminatory circumstances.  
 
Returning again to the example of tax-credits above, while opinion certainly 
differs, many would consider such differential treatment ‘acceptable’ in the 
context of social welfare policy. If that intuition is controlling, the outcome 
may be that different financial needs becomes accepted as the reason for 
denying comparability. The determination concerning comparability has 
then effectively hidden an intuitive determination that the practice is 
justifiable, and subjects the claimant to the caprice of the fact-finder’s 
beliefs about what is ‘acceptable’. In this vein, the Court of Appeal in 
Atkinson noted that justification ought be confined to a later enquiry to 
“avoid decision-making based on instinct rather than analysis.”28 
 
The concern about the role of intuition is amplified by the way that it 
replaces further scrutiny. If it is determined that the claimant cannot be 
compared with the proposed comparator the claim can proceed no further. 
In that case the impugned policy or practice will not be subject to scrutiny 
under s 5 or the relevant provisions for justification or defence. An intuitive 
judgement that the claimant is not sufficiently alike to the proposed 
comparator is substituted for thorough scrutiny of the possible justifications 
                                                
26 Dagmar Schiek, Lisa Waddington and Mark Bell Cases, Materials and Text on National 
Supranational and International Non-discrimination Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2007) 
at 201. 
27 Aileen McColgan "Cracking the Comparator Problem: Discrimination, 'Equal' Treatment 
and the Role of Comparisons" (2006) 6 EHRLR 650 at 672. 
28 Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 5, at [128]. 
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under s 5.29 Where such is the case, claims Haggie, the premature dismissal 
without a more thorough examination of the claim “denies the claimant the 
right to have the disputed policy fully scrutinised for relevance and 
reasonableness.”30 Most importantly, discriminatory practices often align 
with commonly-held beliefs that will prove, in the full measure of time, to 
have been discriminatory. Such practices might reveal themselves to be 
unreasonable or irrational when subjected to scrutiny under s 5. But, when 
the comparator formulation works to legitimise ‘acceptable’ discrimination, 
the non-discrimination provision is depleted of its capacity to challenge the 
status quo.31 
 
3 Burdens of proof 
 
The incorporation of justification at the comparison stage threatens to 
misallocate the burdens of proof and further disadvantage the claimant. 
Monoghan notes, in UK context, that the stages of a discrimination enquiry 
must be assessed “discretely, if the burden of proof provisions ... are to be 
properly respected.”32 The same issue arises in the New Zealand context if 
matters of justification are involved at the comparator stage.  
 
Under the ERA the respective burdens of proof are clear from the structure 
of the legislation. It is the onus of the discriminator to demonstrate that the 
alleged discrimination falls within the exceptions.
33
 The position of the 
Supreme Court in McAlister, that the two enquiries were to be distinct lest 
there be “no work” left for the exception provisions,34 reflects the necessity 
of separating identification and justification of discrimination to maintain 
the proper allocation of burdens. 
 
                                                
29 See Shackell v United Kingdom (45851/99) ECHR 27 April 2000; Stubbings and others v 
United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR 213 (ECHR); and the criticisms thereof in McColgan, 
above n 27, at 660. 
30 Haggie, above n 6, at 39. 
31 See Lord Walker "Treating Like Cases Alike and Unlike Cases Differently: Some 
Problems of Anti-Discrimination Law" (2010) 16 Canta LR 201 at 211; and Nova Scotia 
(Attorney General) v Walsh 2002 SCC 83, [2002] 4 SCR 325 at [200] per Gonthier J. 
32 Monoghan, above n 22, at [6.48]. 
33 Human Rights Act 1993, s 92F. 
34 McAlister v Air New Zealand Ltd, above n 2, at [37]. 
13 
The position is less clear as regards s 19. Certainly if the claim proceeds to s 
5, the burden will fall upon the discriminator.35 But if issues of justification 
that ought be addressed at s 5 are imported to the comparator exercise, the 
burden of establishing a breach of s 19 also demands the claimant go some 
way to disproving the defendant’s justification. Similarly, the defendant’s 
onus may be lowered: if issues of justification succeed at the comparator 
stage, the defendant does not have to later discharge the burden of showing 
the impugned policy or practice to be compliant with s 5.  
 
When the defendant’s submissions on the issue of comparison are allowed 
to address issues of justification, the persuasive burden will fall to the 
claimant. The claimant is compelled to discourage the court from finding 
the justification relevant to the selection of the comparator. Unless issues of 
justification are relegated to a later stage, the claimant may need to lead 
evidence about, for example, the fiscal implications of finding a practice or 
policy to be discriminatory. Further, s 19 claims are made against the State, 
and the claimant suffers from a comparative lack of resources.
36
 Schwartz 
observes that the “claimant usually lacks the resources, access, or 
knowledge of the government [and] should not be expected to take on the 
role of the government’s mind reader.”
37
 This increases the burden on the 
claimant to establish differential treatment and, in turn, a breach of s 19. 
 
B Mirror Comparators 
 
A mirror comparator will be alike to the claimant in every way but for the 
prohibited ground. This approach appears desirable as it promises to place 
the prohibited ground at the centre of the enquiry. The archetypal 
articulation of the mirror comparison was adopted by Binnie J in Hodge v 
Canada:
38
 
 
                                                
35 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary 
(LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005) at [6.7.1].  
36 See Miron v Trudel [1995] 2 SCR 418 at [49] per McLachlin J. 
37 Hart Schwartz “Making Sense of Section 15 of the Charter” (2011) 29 NJCL 201 at 224. 
38 Hodge v Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development) 2004 SCC 65, [2004] 3 
SCR 357 at [23]. 
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The appropriate comparator group is the one which mirrors 
the characteristics of the claimant (or claimant group) relevant to the 
benefit or advantage sought except that the statutory definition 
includes a personal characteristic that is offensive to the Charter or 
omits a personal characteristic in a way that is offensive to the 
Charter. 
 
Where the circumstances are simple, the mirror comparator has the 
advantage of vividly revealing the alleged differential treatment. It has, 
however, been subject to criticism on several grounds and was abandoned 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Withler v Canada.39  
 
Requiring the claimant to produce the correct comparator from the outset 
may impose an inappropriate burden by requiring the claimant to predict the 
court’s choice of a comparator. Gilbert and Majury are concerned that 
“[c]laimants are succumbing to the burden of having to correctly anticipate 
the court's choice of comparator group and having to prove their case in 
relation to that group.” The Court in Withler concurred, noting the risk of 
claims being derailed where a court is willing to substitute a ‘more correct’ 
comparator for that which the claimant chose.40 
 
For instance, where there are multiple possible causes for an allegedly 
discriminatory outcome, the cause that differentiates on a prohibited ground 
may be justified at the comparator stage if the court is of the view that that 
particular cause was not central. The existence of the other possible causes 
can be considered reason to deny comparability. The other possible causes 
then justify the differential treatment at the comparator stage. The Court of 
Appeal in CPAG was alive to this risk, and noted “the existence of another 
criterion which may render the person ineligible for assistance does not of 
itself mean there may not be discrimination on a prohibited ground.”41 
 
The search is not for a perfect mirror, but one that is a mirror in terms of all 
“relevant characteristics.” Tempering the requirement in this way may still 
not relieve the claimant of the burden because, as the Court in Withler 
                                                
39 Withler v Canada (Attorney General) 2011 SCC 12, [2011] 1 SCR 396 at [60]. 
40 At [59]. 
41 Child Poverty Action Group v Attorney General, above n 8, at [64]. 
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observes, “[r]ational people may differ on what characteristics are 
relevant”.42 Moreover, mirror comparisons are likely to blind the courts to 
multiple or intersectional discrimination.
43
 
 
The tenor of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in CPAG suggests that the 
Canadian departure from mirror comparison will be followed in New 
Zealand.44 However, the idea that the ills of mirror comparison can be 
avoided by departing from mirror comparisons is, in the author’s view, 
illusory. Mirror comparisons embody a strict requirement of likeness 
between claimant and comparator. But in making any determination as to 
whether the claimant’s proposed comparator is apt, the court applies some 
standard for likeness. The threshold the court imposes for establishing 
comparability can then be viewed as a spectrum of formalism, where 
comparators generally suffer from the risks of mirror comparison.
45
 
 
C Implications 
 
The recent response by the Court of Appeal in Atkinson and CPAG to the 
risk of premature justification was to require “matters of justification” to be 
relegated to the s 5 enquiry.
46
 This demonstrates an awareness of the risks, 
but is no panacea. Some matters of justification will be easily identifiable 
and excludable from the s 19 enquiry. For instance, questions of the cost of 
finding a policy to be discriminatory relate to the utilitarian calculus of s 5, 
and are not relevant to identifying differential treatment. But the similarity 
between considerations of comparability and justification make it difficult 
to achieve a clear separation of the enquiries. Determinations of 
                                                
42 Withler v Canada (Attorney General), above n 39, at [59]. 
43 Withler v Canada (Attorney General), above n 39, at [58]. The thorough treatment this 
issue merits is beyond the scope of this paper. See further Daphne Gilbert and Diana 
Majury “Critical Comparisons: the Supreme Court of Canada Dooms Section 15” (2006) 
23 Windsor YB Access Just 111; Sarah Hannet “Equality at the Intersections: The 
Legislative and Judicial Failure to Tackle Multiple Discrimination” (2003) 23 OJLS 65; 
Dean Spade "Intersectional Resistance and Law Reform" (2013) 38 Signs 1031; and Nitya 
Iyer "Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social Identity" (1993) 19 
Queen's LJ 179. 
44 Child Poverty Action Group v Attorney General, above n 8, at [49]. 
45 See Moore v British Columbia (Education) 2012 SCC 61 at [30]. 
46 Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 5, at [132]; and Child Poverty Action Group v 
Attorney General, above n 8, at [65]. 
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comparability can operate as justification by another name, without clearly 
offending the judicial direction to exclude matters of justification from the 
comparison. Mirror comparisons are the most extreme form of this form of 
justification, but less strict standards required for comparability can have the 
same effect. The difficulty in excluding matters of justification from the s 
19 enquiry and preserving the neutral meaning of discrimination is borne 
out by the New Zealand jurisprudence.  
 
III The Comparative Approach in New Zealand 
 
This Part will examine the development of discrimination jurisprudence in 
New Zealand. There is a striking vagueness as to precisely what shape the 
comparator should take. Particular attention will be given to the High 
Court’s decision in B as it is emblematic of the consequences of the 
approach the appellate courts have adopted toward the role of comparators 
in discrimination claims. 
 
A Formulation of the Comparator 
 
Quilter v Attorney-General (Quilter)47 was an early application of non-
discrimination provisions. Tipping J adopted the comparative approach, 
drawing upon a traditional understanding of the meaning of 
discrimination—in essence, the “difference of treatment in comparable 
circumstances.”48 Unfortunately little direction emerges as to the 
formulation of comparators. Tipping J suggested that the appropriate 
comparator would be persons whose treatment was “logically relevant” to 
that of the claimant,49 but did not venture to give further depth to the notion 
of ‘relevance’.  
 
In McAlister the Supreme Court adverted to the possibility that, had it been 
dealing with a case brought under s 19, the Court may have needed to 
                                                
47 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523. 
48 At 573 per Tipping J. 
49 At 573 per Tipping J. 
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“formulate its own concept of discrimination”.50 Nonetheless, Elias CJ for 
the majority ventured to describe the role of a court in formulating a 
comparator:
51
 
 
The task of a court is to select the comparator which best fits the 
statutory scheme in relation to the particular ground of discrimination 
which is in issue, taking full account of all facets of the scheme, 
including particularly any defences made available to the person 
against whom discrimination is alleged. A comparator which is 
appropriate in one setting may produce a completely inapt result in 
another. It will certainly do so if it effectively deprives part of the 
statutory scheme of its operation. 
 
The relevance of this direction to the interpretation of s 19 is limited in light 
of the fact that it concerned a case under the ERA. It has, though, been read 
more broadly to be of relevance in cases brought under s 19 and so its 
meaning is of significance. 
 
The observation comprises two operative parts. First, that the comparator 
should be shaped by the statutory scheme and, second, that a comparator 
will be inappropriate if it deprives the statutory scheme of its operation. The 
import of both parts is contingent on the proper meaning of “statutory 
scheme.” The phrase could have been referring to the statutory scheme 
under which the claim was brought (the narrow interpretation). Conversely, 
it could be taken to refer to the impugned scheme where the claim alleges 
that a statutory scheme is discriminatory (the broad interpretation). 
 
The broad interpretation is undesirable because it allows questions of 
justification to be imported into the comparator exercise. It lends credence 
to the intuition that the rationales of the impugned scheme —in effect, the 
discriminatory circumstances—have a role to play in the formation of the 
comparator. Moreover, the narrow interpretation ought to be preferred 
simply because it seems more plausible: all discrimination claims will 
necessarily be brought under statutory schemes given that non-
discrimination provisions are contained in statutes, but not all discrimination 
claims will allege that a statutory scheme is discriminatory. Further, the 
                                                
50 McAlister v Air New Zealand Ltd, above n 2, at [33]. 
51 At [34]. 
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reference to defences suggests that the observation concerns the non-
discrimination provisions under which discrimination has been alleged. 
Nonetheless, while courts have generally adopted the narrow 
interpretation,52 in B Collins J understood the direction to refer to the 
impugned scheme. Further, the broad interpretation was argued in Atkinson 
but was neither rejected nor endorsed. 
 
Aside from the direction to avoid matters of justification during the s 19 
enquiry,
53
 the directions that emerge from Atkinson and CPAG are no more 
clear. The Court in Atkinson framed a breach of s 19 as consisting of 
“differential treatment or effects as between persons or groups in analogous 
or comparable situations on the basis of a prohibited ground of 
discrimination.”54 The Court did not, though, take the opportunity to further 
describe the contours of “comparable situations.” In the author’s view, the 
judgment provides little more than the direction that the comparator should 
not be “artificial” or “circular” by incorporating the discriminator’s 
“philosophy”.
55
 In CPAG the Court indicated that in selecting the 
comparator the Court must be looking at the “reality of the situation”,56 yet 
little more was said as to what that means for the selection of a comparator. 
No clear method for the formulation of a comparator emerges. The gist of 
the authorities is that the comparator is very much a creature of context.  
 
B The Difficulty of Excluding Matters of Justification 
 
Given the lack of authority as to how to formulate a comparator, finding a 
bright line between determinations as to comparability and matters of 
justification has proved difficult. In McAlister, The Supreme Court 
encountered the distinction. McAlister, a pilot, had brought a claim against 
Air New Zealand alleging discrimination contrary to s 104 of the ERA 
                                                
52 Smith v Air New Zealand Ltd [2011] NZCA 20, [2011] 2 NZLR 171 at [31]; Attorney-
General on behalf of the Ministry of Health v Idea Services Ltd (in stat man) [2012] NZHC 
3229 at [136]; and Service and Food Workers Union Nga Ringa Tota Inc v Terranova 
Homes and Care Ltd [2013] NZEmpC 157 at [39]. 
53 Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 5, at [132]; and Child Poverty Action Group v 
Attorney General, above n 8, at [65]. 
54 Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 5, at [55]. 
55 At [66]–[67]. 
56 Child Poverty Action Group v Attorney General, above n 8, at [51]. 
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following his demotion upon attaining the age of 60 years. The United 
States had adopted a rule prohibiting those aged over 60 from being pilots-
in-command. Subsequently Air New Zealand did not allow pilots over the 
age of 60 to command its 747 aircrafts. 
 
The Court of Appeal had found that the appropriate comparator group was 
not, as the claimant contended, pilots under the age of 60. Instead, it was 
held that the appropriate comparator group was pilots that for some reason 
other than age (such as the lack of a visa) were not permitted to fly to the 
United States.57 The Court of Appeal’s formulation was a mirror 
comparator: the only ground of difference was age, after the discriminatory 
circumstances were incorporated with the comparison. The strict 
requirement of comparability effected a justification at the stage of 
comparison.  
 
This formulation was rejected by the Supreme Court. The incorporation into 
the comparator of justification or defence—here being whether age was a 
“genuine occupational qualification”58—would “prove too much.”59 The 
comparator left “no work to do for ss 30 and 35 [of the HRA], which are an 
important part of the statutory scheme concerning age discrimination and 
introduce carefully stated checks and balances.”60 The Court required that 
the identification of discrimination and the defence be distinct enquiries. 
But the Court did not go so far as to identify the broader concern of 
premature justification that affects comparisons under both the ERA and s 
19. 
 
It should be noted that the comparators selected by the Court of Appeal and 
Supreme Court, while different, both conform with the basic premise of the 
court making a determination as to comparability. The difference is that the 
Court of Appeal applied a stricter standard of comparability, in part due to a 
focus on causation as an important factor for the formulation of the 
                                                
57 Air New Zealand Ltd v McAlister [2008] NZCA 264, [2008] 3 NZLR 794 at [90]. 
58 Human Rights Act 1993, s 30(1). 
59 McAlister v Air New Zealand Ltd, above n 2, at [37]. 
60 At [37]. 
20 
comparator.61 The Court of Appeal’s approach as it was framed could be 
said to not formally offend the direction in Atkinson and CPAG to exclude 
matters of justification from the s 19 enquiry,
62
 though in substance it does.  
 
The Court of Appeal adopted the limited comparator in part because it was 
thought to provide a better picture of whether the alleged discrimination was 
on the basis of the prohibited ground—it permitted “a focus on the true role 
of that factor”.63 So formally the outcome could be ascribed to a 
determination that the treatment was not on the basis of a prohibited ground, 
rather than an incorporation of justification. Justification is, though, its 
effect. Where the intuition is that there is a plausible alternative explanation 
for the differential treatment, formulating the comparator to assess whether 
the treatment was on the basis of a prohibited ground can function as 
justification. 
 
The involvement of justification at the comparator stage was again at issue 
in Atkinson. The respondent, the Ministry of Health, argued that the 
comparator preferred by the High Court was inappropriate as it would 
prevent the operation of the policy.64 Such a comparator would, it was 
submitted, offend against the McAlister direction that a comparator will be 
inappropriate where it “effectively deprives part of the statutory scheme of 
its operation.”65 It was submitted that to avoid depriving the policy of its 
operation, the comparator should recognise that the familial relationships 
between the claimants and their disabled children rendered them 
incomparable with other caregivers.66 It appears that the Ministry’s strategy 
was to persuade the Court to accept a comparator narrowly constructed in 
conformity with the allegedly discriminatory policy to avoid the more 
thorough scrutiny of a s 5 enquiry. 
 
                                                
61 At [45]. 
62 Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 5, at [132]; and Child Poverty Action Group v 
Attorney General, above n 8, at [65]. 
63 Air New Zealand Ltd v McAlister, above n 58, at [90]. 
64 Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 5, at [70]. 
65 McAlister v Air New Zealand Ltd, above n 2, at [34]. 
66 Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 5, at [67]. 
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The Court dismissed the Ministry’s comparator broadly for two reasons. 
Firstly, it was said to reflect an artificial incorporation of the Ministry’s 
philosophy.
67
 But while the Court was alive to the “circularity” of the 
Ministry’s proposed comparator, it failed to establish a principled boundary 
between the comparator and discriminatory circumstances. The Court 
rejected the resultant comparator, but did not clearly reject the thinking that 
underpinned the Ministry’s submission. 
 
This failing is evidenced by the Court’s adoption of evidential factors as the 
second ground on which to reject the Ministry’s submission. The Court 
noted that prior payments to individuals in the same class as the claimants 
had not “brought the system to an end.”68 This response indicates a lack of 
conceptual clarity as it contradicts the first ground for rejecting the 
submission—that the discriminatory circumstances should not intrude upon 
the comparator. By implication, had the fiscal implications been more 
grave, the Court may have been willing to find the claimant’s comparator 
inappropriate on those grounds. Entertaining this line of enquiry suggests 
that the cost of the scheme is a factor relevant to the likenesses between the 
claimant and the proposed comparator.  
 
This confusion is underscored by the Court’s failure to reject explicitly the 
Ministry’s interpretation of McAlister: that a comparator is inappropriate 
where it deprives the impugned scheme of operation.
69
 Indeed, considering 
the fiscal consequence of a finding of comparability implicitly endorses that 
interpretation. That the Court considered what are in fact matters of 
justification while in the same judgment stating that they were irrelevant to 
the comparator demonstrates that a bright line between comparability and 
justification is elusive. Moreover, allowing such evidence to be led in 
relation to the selection of the comparator risks misallocating the burdens of 
proof by requiring the claimant to lead evidence on the fiscal implications of 
their claim, as was the case here.70 Had the Ministry’s submission been 
                                                
67 Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 5, at [67]. 
68 At [73]. 
69 At [70]. 
70 At [72]. 
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rejected on principled grounds the outcome in B could perhaps have been 
avoided. 
 
C B v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development 
 
In B the High Court considered whether asset deprivation regulations 
concerning gifting to trusts in the context of an application for a residential 
care subsidy were discriminatory on the ground of family status. Mrs and 
Mr B had, for some time, each gifted $27,000 per year to a family trust. In 
2009 Mrs B moved into a rest home and applied for the residential care 
subsidy, which is subject to means assessment. At issue was whether the 
Social Security Act 1964 and relevant regulations allowed means 
assessment for the subsidy to include an aggregation of a couple’s gifts, or if 
the gifts of one partner may be considered independently. Counsel for B 
contended, inter alia, that the aggregation of gifts was inconsistent with her 
right not to be subject to discrimination on grounds of family status, as 
defined in s 21(1)(b) of the HRA.
71
 Following the Court of Appeal in 
Atkinson, Collins J adopted a comparative approach.72 
 
The error in the formulation of the comparator begins with Collins J’s use of 
an example of the comparator methodology, which he considers to be useful 
as an illustration of “how comparator methodology can on occasions 
illuminate unjustifiable discrimination.”
73
 This description of the usefulness 
of the methodology claims too much. Comparators can identify differential 
treatment, but are not apt to the more complicated task of assessing whether 
such treatment is justifiable.  
 
The example comparator addresses a discriminatory element of the 
regulations that were not at issue in B—the pre-2007 distinction between 
couples in same-sex de facto relationships and those in other forms of 
relationship. The comparator formulated to identify that distinction was 
then:74 
                                                
71 B v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development, above n 7, at [65]. 
72 At [66]. 
73 At [68]. 
74 At [69]. 
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(1) Couple A are in a same sex de facto relationship; 
(2) Couple B are married, in a civil union or opposite sex de facto 
relationship; 
(3) Couple A and B's circumstances are in all material respects 
identical. However, Couple A were treated more favourably than 
Couple B solely because they were in a same sex de facto relationship. 
 
This is a mirror comparator. The only difference between the hypothetical 
claimants Couple A and the comparator Couple B is the ground of 
discrimination: marital status. Mirror comparators are not per se 
inappropriate—sometimes the mirror of the claimant makes for an apt 
comparison, but not because it is a mirror.75 The reliance on this example 
locked the process into a search for a mirror comparison of B: if the 
example comparator is undisputed and is a mirror of the hypothetical 
claimant then nothing less will suffice for the actual comparison the 
claimant seeks.  
 
The problems that begin with the misleading example are exacerbated by 
subsequent adoption of the broad interpretation of the McAlister dicta 
suggesting that the ideal comparator is that which “best fits the statutory 
scheme.”76 Collins J appears to interpret this as a direction to mould the 
comparator to the contours of the impugned scheme, rather than the non-
discrimination provisions under which the claim has been brought, adopting 
what was above termed the broad interpretation. 
 
B’s proposed comparator (a single person) was rejected on the grounds that 
such a formulation “ignores the statutory scheme and purpose of the Act and 
Regulations which are reflected by the lawmaker’s view that couples ... co-
mingle their assets and ought be treated as a combined unit rather than two 
individuals when assessing the nature of the disposed assets.”77 As such 
Collins J concluded that “there is no discrimination because the lawmakers 
have not failed to treat like cases alike.”78 The claimant and the comparator 
                                                
75 See Withler v Canada (Attorney General), above n 39, at [55]; and above at [Mirror 
Comparators]. 
76 McAlister v Air New Zealand Ltd, above n 2, at [34]. 
77 B v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development, above n 7, at [74]. 
78 At [75]. 
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are determined to not be sufficiently alike because the rationale underlying 
the policy is reason to not consider them alike. Entertaining the legislative 
purpose during the formulation of the comparator leads to the incorporation 
of justification at the comparator stage. That, as discussed above, Collins J 
expects the comparator methodology to comprise both identification and 
justification
79
 might go some way to explain his conclusion that, in light of 
the purpose of the Act and regulations, there is no plausible comparator.  
 
Certainly there are situations where a lawmaker’s view is patently 
unreasonable. Returning to Collins J’s example comparator, the law maker’s 
view that same-sex de facto couples ought to be treated differently would 
surely not have sufficed as reason to consider them incomparable with 
couples in other forms of relationship. The controlling difference appears to 
be that the form of discrimination at issue in B falls within the bounds of 
differential treatment that is considered ‘acceptable’. The scheme was 
discriminatory: it did disadvantage Mrs B by differential treatment on 
grounds of family status. It might however be justifiable discrimination. But 
the flexibility of the methodology allowed the comparator exercise to serve 
as cover for the intuitive conclusion that this kind of differential treatment is 
not deserving of being described as discrimination.  
 
The lawmaker’s view may be a sufficient justification if it can sustain 
scrutiny under s 5. But the sufficiency of the justification cannot be known 
in the absence of that scrutiny. Ironically, Collins J acknowledges that a 
consideration of s 5 would have been difficult “absent submissions and 
possibly evidence from the Crown” as to whether the differential treatment 
was justifiable.80 This observation underscores the concern that 
justifications that occur during the comparator exercise are subject to less 
scrutiny than those that arise under a s 5 enquiry. Indeed, the Ministry did 
not have to lead any evidence as to the reasonableness or rationality of the 
differential treatment. 
 
 
                                                
79 B v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development, above n 7, at [68]. 
80 At [76]. 
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D Conclusion 
 
In the author’s view, no clear methodology for the formulation of the 
comparator emerges from the case law. The various disputes and reasoning 
as the choice of the comparator indicates that the courts struggle to exclude 
matters of justification from the comparator stage. Indeed, the decision in B 
raises concerns that the directions of the Court of Appeal in Atkinson and 
CPAG might not prevent the incorporation of justification at the comparator 
stage. While B was decided before CPAG, the direction that matters of 
justification should not form part of the s 19 enquiry was clear in Atkinson, 
a judgment that Collins J relied on in B.81 It is no simple task to exclude 
matters of justification from the comparator. Where the court involves itself 
in determining whether the claimant and proposed comparator are suitably 
comparable, intuitions about whether the differential treatment is 
‘acceptable’ can result in a denial of comparability that amounts to 
justification.  
 
IV Reformulating the Comparator 
 
This paper proposes that a change of approach is necessary to remedy the 
deficiencies of comparator methodology. The courts should remain open to 
non-comparative means of establishing a breach of s 19. Nonetheless, where 
a comparator is used, greater conceptual clarity as to the purpose and 
limitations of the methodology is necessary. 
 
A Complementary Approaches 
 
While some non-discrimination provisions require a comparative 
approach,82 s 19 simple expresses the principle of non-discrimination.83 
Accordingly, some authors have suggested that s 19 can bear a non-
                                                
81 B v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development, above n 7, at [66]. 
82 McAlister v Air New Zealand Ltd, above n 2, at [33]. See s 104 of the Employment 
Relations Act 2000; s 65 of the Human Rights Act 1993; and s 3(1)(b) of the Equal Pay Act 
1972. 
83 Section 19(1) reads: “Everyone has the right to freedom from discrimination on the 
grounds of discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993.” Compare s 15 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982. 
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comparative interpretation.84 But, even if discrimination is a fundamentally 
comparative concept,85 it is not necessary that the tools used for the 
identification of discrimination be likewise comparative.
86
 Indeed, recent 
authority increasingly supports the proposition that the comparator is not the 
sole gateway to a finding of discrimination under s 19.87 In Atkinson the 
Court of Appeal noted that no-one took any issue with the High Court’s 
treatment of the comparator as a “helpful tool”.88 Similarly in CPAG the 
comparator was considered to be “simply a tool in the analysis”.89 
 
What the alternative analysis might be is less clear. In Shamoon v Chief 
Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary Lord Nicholls described the 
search for a comparator to be potentially “arid and confusing” and better 
replaced by a causative assessment: the focus ought be on “why” the 
claimant was treated in the way that she was.
90
 Similarly, Moreau suggests 
that treatment based on prejudice or stereotyping needs no comparison to be 
found discriminatory.91 But, while apt in some circumstances, such an 
approach with its focus on intention might fail to capture unwitting or 
‘benign’ discrimination.92  
 
B A Reformulation 
 
Even if the comparator is complemented by alternative approaches it 
remains imperative that the courts develop a comprehensive conception of 
the role and limitations of the methodology. The case law lacks a consistent 
                                                
84 Hannah Bain “Turning Equality into Fact: The Status of Comparator Group Analyses in 
New Zealand Discrimination Law” (LLB (Hons) Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 
2010) at 9. But see Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 at 573 per Tipping J. 
85 Butler and Butler, above n 35, at [17.12.1]. 
86 See Sophia Moreau “Equality Rights and the Relevance of Comparator Groups” (2006) 5 
JL & Equality 81; Sophia Moreau “The Wrongs of Unequal Treatment” (2004) 54 UTLJ 
291; Hart Schwartz “Making Sense of Section 15 of the Charter” (2011) 29 NJCL 201; and 
Suzanne Goldberg "Discrimination by comparison” (2010) 120 Yale LJ 728. 
87 Haggie, above n 6, at 45. 
88 Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 5, at [60]. 
89 Child Poverty Action Group v Attorney General, above n 8, at [51]–[52]. 
90 Shamoon v Chief Constable of of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] UKHL 11 at [11] 
per Lord Nicholls. 
91 See Moreau “The Wrongs of Unequal Treatment”, above n 86, at 303; and Moore v 
British Columbia (Education) 2012 SCC 61 at [30]. 
92 Butler and Butler, above n 35, at [17.14.2]. 
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conception of what the comparator is supposed to achieve. In B, Collins J 
expected it to be able to determine whether the differential treatment was 
justifiable.
93
 The Court in CPAG considered the comparator to be apt “to 
sort out those distinctions which are made on the basis of a prohibited 
ground.”94 These conceptions demand too much. 
 
A good starting point is the observation of Tipping J in McAlister that the 
policy of non-discrimination provisions requires a “purposive and 
untechnical approach to whether there is ... prima facie discrimination”,
95
 
echoing his earlier observations in Quilter.96 Similarly useful is the 
Employment Court’s observation in SFWU v Terranova that the comparator 
is simply a “means to an end”.97 In the author’s view, that end ought to be to 
frame the s 19 enquiry.  
 
1 Differential treatment 
 
The author proposes that what has been previously seen to be the first limb
98
 
of the s 19 enquiry be understood as in some circumstances comprising two 
limbs. The question of whether there has been differential treatment on a 
prohibited ground should be divided in two. Differential treatment is the 
first: has the claimant been treated differently to their proposed comparator? 
Here, the court should defer to the claimant’s choice of a comparison. The 
conclusion produced by the comparator can then frame the second question, 
that being whether the differential treatment was on a prohibited ground. 
Such a division might appear artificial. That artificiality is useful, though, to 
properly focus the respective enquiries. 
 
                                                
93 B v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development, above n 7, at [68]. 
94 Child Poverty Action Group v Attorney General, above n 8, at [51]. 
95 McAlister v Air New Zealand Ltd, above n 2, at [51]. 
96 Quilter v Attorney-General, above n 47, at 576. 
97 Service and Food Workers Union Nga Ringa Tota Inc v Terranova Homes and Care Ltd, 
above n 52, at [37]. 
98 Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 5, at [55]; and Butler and Butler, above n 35, at 
[17.9.40]. 
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First, deference to the claimant gives substance to the direction to avoid 
incorporating matters of justification at the comparator stage.99 It is not in 
the claimant’s interest to incorporate discriminatory circumstances into the 
proposed comparator. Intrusions of the limiting norms discussed in this 
paper occur to the extent that the court denies comparability or engages in 
the task of reformulating the comparator at the behest of the defendant.  
 
Secondly, deferring to the claimant for the selection of the comparator 
should avoid what are,  in the author’s view, overly technical concerns 
about whether a given comparator is acceptable or not. It is not surprising 
that the courts have gone no further than general nods towards notions of 
‘relevance’ and ‘materiality’. Arcane disputes as to which characteristics are 
material to the comparison serve only to confuse the analysis and occlude 
the question of whether there has been differential treatment. The 
complexity of the analysis gives rise to the same concerns about the risk of 
over-burdening potential claimants that was a criticism of mirror 
comparators.
100
 And, more simply, reframing the claimant’s comparator 
neglects to treat their experience with the respect it deserves. 
 
Thirdly, it resolves the concerns attendant to the use of mirror comparisons. 
Unlike the suggestion that mirror comparators be abandoned altogether,101 
deference allows the claimant to adopt a mirror comparison where it is apt 
and avoid the use of the same where it is not. The harms of mirror 
comparison only manifest where the claimant is compelled to find a mirror 
comparison at pain of having the claim dismissed. In some circumstances 
mirror comparison will be entirely apt to expose discrimination.
102
 
 
2 Causation 
 
Sometimes the question as to whether the differential treatment was on the 
basis of a prohibited ground will be answered by the comparison, 
                                                
99 Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 5, at [132]; and Child Poverty Action Group v 
Attorney General, above n 8, at [65]. 
100 Gilbert and Majury, above n 23, at 138. 
101 Haggie, above n 6, at 46. 
102 Jennifer Koshan and Jonnette Hamilton “Meaningless Mantra: Substantive Equality 
after Withler” 16 Rev Const Stud 31 at 53.  
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particularly where it is possible to form a mirror comparison.103 A mirror 
comparison produces a very strong inference that the differential treatment 
was on the proscribed ground and all but obviates the need to consider 
causation. But where a mirror comparison is not possible, it is necessary to 
decouple the issue of whether the differential treatment was on the 
prohibited ground from the issue of whether there was differential treatment 
at all.104 Once the claimant has established differential treatment as regards 
their proposed comparator, it can then be asked whether the prohibited 
ground was “material”
105
 to the differential treatment.
106
  
 
Requiring that questions of causation be addressed separately avoids 
allowing for intuitive determinations that the alternate explanations for 
differential treatment prevent comparability. In CPAG it was acknowledged 
that in cases where multiple criteria operated in concert to produce the 
allegedly discriminatory outcome, or where effects-based discrimination 
was at issue, a focus on whether the discrimination was “on the basis of the 
prohibited ground” may be necessary.
107
 As was the case in McAlister at the 
Court of Appeal, questions of whether treatment was on the basis of a 
prohibited ground readily fold back into considerations of whether claimant 
and comparator are legitimately comparable if the question is asked at the 
comparator stage.  
 
Such an approach avoids allowing issues of possible multiple causation to 
deny comparability, as was the case in the Court of Appeal decision in 
McAlister. Once McAlister had identified the comparator (pilots under the 
age of 60) the only conclusion as to causation could be that age was material 
to the outcome. Any questions of whether the differential treatment fell 
within an exception would have to be left to enquiries under those 
                                                
103 Child Poverty Action Group v Attorney General, above n 8, at [51]. 
104 Compare Child Poverty Action Group v Attorney General, above n 8, at [51]–[52]. 
105 McAlister v Air New Zealand Ltd, above n 2, at [49] per Tipping J; and Child Poverty 
Action Group v Attorney General, above n 8, at [64]. 
106 See for example the analysis in Attorney-General on behalf of the Ministry of Health v 
Idea Services Ltd (in stat man), above n 52, at [141]–[159]. 
107 Child Poverty Action Group v Attorney General, above n 8, at [52]. Compare Attorney-
General on behalf of the Ministry of Health v Idea Services Ltd (in stat man), above n 52, at 
[141] where “on the basis of” was seen as a step subsequent to the identification of the 
comparator. 
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provisions, rather than being bound up in the comparator analysis. Likewise, 
this approach would have avoided the outcome in B. Framed by the 
comparison Mrs B sought (single persons) the inescapable conclusion is that 
her family status was a material cause of the differential treatment. 
 
Finally, treating causation as distinct from identifying differential treatment 
should quell any fears that deference to the claimant in the selection of the 
comparator might admit unmeritorious claims. The claimant still bears the 
burden of establishing that the prohibited ground was material to the 
differential treatment their proposed comparator illustrates.  
 
C A Lower Threshold? 
 
The effect of these recommendations is to lower the de facto threshold to 
establishing a differential treatment by ensuring a neutral conception of 
discrimination. Huscroft has misgivings that such an approach allows for 
any differential treatment accompanied by disadvantage to be described as 
discrimination, which “may end up trivialising” rather than protecting the 
right to freedom from discrimination.108 Similarly, Haggie expresses 
concern that the low threshold established by the Court of Appeal in 
Atkinson leads to “uncomfortable questions” about precedent: findings of 
prima facie discrimination that are justifiable under s 5 might trivialise the 
idea of discrimination.
109
 
 
Trivialisation might occur where policies or practices that make justifiable 
distinctions between people were found unlawful. But such a determination 
would require that a court find them unable to survive scrutiny under s 5, at 
which point it is no longer ‘trivial’. It should be recalled that a prima facie 
finding of discrimination is not determinative, and any stigma of a prima 
facie finding is the unavoidable consequence of a “general rule from which 
exceptions are allowed.”110 
 
                                                
108 Huscroft, above n 17, at 376. 
109 Haggie, above n 6, at 45. 
110 McAlister v Air New Zealand Ltd, above n 2, at [55] per Tipping J. 
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But such a claim might also hide less laudable value-judgements about the 
appropriate scope of non-discrimination provisions. Haggie’s 
“uncomfortable” example concerns whether a parent who chose to care for a 
child at home where a daycare funding was available would succeed in 
establishing a breach of s 19 in a manner similar to the claimants in 
Atkinson.
111
 Perhaps the ‘gut reaction’ that the effect of such a scheme 
cannot be “true discrimination”112 should not be trusted. There might be a 
legitimate concern that the burden of unpaid family responsibilities 
disproportionately affects women. The merits of that concern might stand 
fully revealed if subject to scrutiny under s 5. Relying on a ‘gut reaction’ 
that such is not the case is somewhat less educative.  
 
Beyond trivialisation, Huscroft also expresses the pragmatic concern that 
the state will be overburdened by defending claims of discrimination if the 
threshold is too low. Admittedly, the operation of state requires differential 
treatment.113 Yet the State has also committed itself to refrain from 
differentiating between persons on limited number of grounds. Where it 
breaches that commitment it must be called to account for why it has chosen 
to do so. The unavoidable power-imbalance between the claimant and the 
State demands that the latter should be willing to bear a larger burden in 
discrimination proceedings. It is desirable to adopt a “broad approach” to 
the role of comparators114 that requires s 5 to do more work, if that is what 
is necessary to err on the side of caution and avoid the premature dismissal 
of potentially legitimate claims. In any event the claimant still bears the 
burden of establishing a breach of s 19. Most importantly, by requiring the 
State to justify discrimination where it occurs, the non-discrimination 
provisions hold it to account in a valuable way: it advances that “trend of 
progressive legal development ... toward the better justification of 
decisions”.
115
  
 
                                                
111 Haggie, above n 6, at 45. 
112 At 45. 
113 Child Poverty Action Group v Attorney General, above n 8, at [51]. 
114 Butler and Butler, above n 35, at [17.12.10]. 
115 See Etienne Mureinik “Emerging from Emergency: Human Rights in South Africa” 
(1994) 92 Mich L Rev 1977 at 1985. See also Butler and Butler, above n 35, at [6.8]. 
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V Conclusion 
 
Comparators can be a useful tool in assessing whether differential treatment 
has occurred. Nonetheless, the method tends to encourage justification of 
differential treatment in absence of sufficient scrutiny. The instructions to 
exclude matters of justification from the comparator stage adopted in 
Atkinson and CPAG go some way to ameliorating the risk of premature 
justification. But so long as the courts continue to modify or reject 
claimants’ comparators on the grounds that they are insufficiently alike, the 
risk of excluding otherwise viable claims at an early stage remains. 
 
Deferring to the claimant’s choice of comparator avoids allowing matters of 
justification to prematurely exclude the claim. Separating the question of 
whether there has been differential treatment from whether that treatment 
was on a prohibited ground prevents the comparison from being confused 
with issues of causation.  
 
Recalling Westen’s observation that to “say that people are morally alike is 
therefore to articulate a moral standard of treatment”,116 it must be admitted 
that intuition and value-judgements will have some role to play in 
discrimination claims—such allows the provisions to adapt over time. The 
risk, though, is borne out by our history. The Court of Appeal was apt to 
note in Atkinson that “[d]istinctions have been drawn in the past which 
would now be universally regarded with some horror.”
117
 When deciding 
who is comparable, and who might be equal, the courts ought to tread 
carefully.  
                                                
116 Westen, above n 1, at 545. 
117 Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 5, at [131]. 
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